Volume 2
Issue 1 The Forum - Volume 2, Issue 1
11-1897

The Forum - Volume 2, Issue 1

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/forum

Recommended Citation
The Forum - Volume 2, Issue 1, 2 DICK. L. REV. 1 (2020).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/forum/vol2/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in The Forum by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more information, please
contact lja10@psu.edu.

THE FORUM.
No. I

NOVEMBER, 1897.

VoL IL

Published Monthly by the Students of

THE DICKINSON SCHOOL OF LAW,
CARLISLE, PA.
EDITORS.
G. FRANK WETZEL.
WALTER G. TREIBLY.
HERMAN M. SYPHERD.

CLAUDE L. ROTH.
FRANK P. SELLERS.

BUSINESS MANAGERS.
ALBERT 9. MORGAN.
MERKEL LANDIS.
CHARLES G. MOYER.

PHILIP E. RADLE.
GABRIEL H. MOYER.
Subscription, $1.25 per Annum.

Address all Communications to
THE FORUM, CARLISLE, PA.

EDITORIAL.
BLACKSTONE.
The study of Blackstone has been recently introduced into the curriculum of
the school. The Junior and Middle classes
are subjected to fortnightly examinations,
conducted by Andrew G. Miller, Esq., of
the Cumberland County Bar. The first of
Blackstone's lectures was delivered before
the University of Oxford on October 25,
1758, and the author's preface to the Commentaries bears the date of Nov. 2, 1765.
In the 130 years that have elapsed since
that time, it may readily be believed that
the law has undergone profound modification. Many broad fields of the present law
were then wholly unoccupied. The usages
of pleading have been gravely altered,
and even Real Property, the least mutable
perhaps of the branches of the law, has
been vitally changed, both in England and
in this country. One might have a very
good knowledge of Blackstone and be
grossly at fault, even with regard to topics
treated by him with his well known luminosity and correctness. Nevertheless, in
the estimation of the profession in Pennsylvania and many otherstates, Blackstone
is canonical, and for a lawyer not to
be acquainted with his text is believed
by many as great a solecism as for a
Protestant minister not to be acquainted
with the text of the Gospels. We are told
that as early as the Revolution he was much

studied and admired by American lawyers,
and there has been an uninterrupted cultus
of him since that day. In many counties
of this state, untilrecently, to be acquainted
with Blackstone was to be qualified for admission to the bar. It is true that, with
the development of scientific methods of
teaching the law, the place of Blackstone
has become less conspicuous; and but few
leading law schools employ him as a text
book. It has been deemed however proper
to so far defer to the existing and but slowly
decaying veneration for the author as to
give a place to him in the course of study
in the school. The Commentaries will
forever remain a standard for the purity,
lucidity and ease of their style and for the
accuracy of their summation of the law as
it was at the time of their composition. As
a landmark in the history of the evolution
of the law they are of inestimable value.
They therefore possess, even now, a high educational value.
Besides the fortnightly examination
upon parts of Blackstone previously assigned for study, there will be at the close
of each year a minute examination on so
much as shall have been pursued during
that year. The Junior and the Middle
classes have already had each two fortnightly examinations. Their results are
carefully noted. Absences are treated as
failures, unless excused, and excuses do not
relieve from the debit of failure, unless
there is a subsequent submission to an examination.
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THE UTiILTY OF LAW SCHOOLS.
Prof. Bryce attributes the ability of the
American lawyers "to the extraordinary
excellence of many of the law schools."
Chief-Justice Waite once said: "The
time has gone by when an eminent lawyer, in full practice, can take a class of
students into his office and become their
teacher. Once that was practicable, but
now it is not."
THE REMODELLING OF THE COURSE.
The catalogue of the school foreshadowed a year ago the extension of the course
from two years to three. This extension
has required the introduction of new
studies and the redistribution of the studies formerly in the curriculum. The classes are denominated Junior, Middle and
Senior. In the Junior year, Blackstone's
Commentaries, Real Property, Contracts,
Torts, Criminal Law, Domestic Relations
and Bailments will be studied, together
with Practice. Corporations, heretofore a
Junior study, will be transferred into the
Middle year. The studies of the Middle
year will be Blackstone, Agency, Sales of
Personal Property, Corporations, Pleading, Equity Practice, Decedents' Estates,
Damages. The subject of Evidence will
be studied this year by the Middle class.
The Seniors will pursue Quasi-contracts,
Evidence, Constitutional Law, Bills and
Notes, Partnership, Practice, Liens, Insurance. This arrangement is not inflexible, and will be modified as experience
suggests.
JUDGE McCLUR.E'S LECTURE.
On Friday evening, Nov. 19th, Hon.
Harold M. McClure, of the 17th Judicial
District, embracing Union and Snyder
counties, delivered a lecture before the
students of the school and others, in the
large lecture room on the second floor.
The theme of the lecture was bills and
notes. A sealed note, with waiver of inquisition and exemption, was written on
the blackboard, and the various elements
of it explained: the seal, inquisition, exemption, etc. Then followed a note, negotiable in form, payable at a bank, and
endorsed by the payee for the accommodation of the maker. This was discussed

in a similar manner. We were pleased
with the freshness and independence of
the views expressed by the learned gentleman. Of the desirableness of abolishingthe
seal; of prohibiting the waiver by a debtor
of the exemption of some of his property
from execution, and of assimilating the law
of Pennsylvania to that of other states,
with respect to allowing the set off of every
claim owned by the maker of a note against
a holder who acquired it by an endorsement from the payee after its maturity, we
share with him the full conviction. At
the conclusion of this very clear and interesting-but all too brief-lecture, on
motion of Mr. G. Frank Wetzel of the
Middle Class, the cordial thanks of the
school were tendered to Judge McClute.
MIr. G. H. Moyer, of the Middle Class, presided. We express the earnest sentiment
of the whole student body, when we say
that we hope the learned jurist will soon
give us the pleasure and the instruction
of another lecture.
Judge McClure, of the 17th District, who
lectured before the students on Nov. 19th,
has been holding court for Judge Biddle,
on account of the serious, and at last, fatal
illness of Mr. J. H. Bosler. Judge McClure has given great satisfaction to the
bar, and to suitors, for the prompt, independent and intelligent manner in
which he has dispatched business.
The death of Hon. Samuel Hepburn has
been an occasion of special regret to the
students. A member of the first class to
enter this school in 1834, he became an instructor in it immediately upon graduation. His subsequent long career has
been eminently useful and honorable. The
editors of THE Foitum[ were fortunate in
obtaining from the eminent gentleman an
account of the early school, which appeared in the June issue. We extend to
the members of the family of the deceased
our sincere condolence.
It is with pain that we advert to the
death of J. Herman Bosler, Esq., of Carlisle, on Nov. 19th. Mr. Bosler was a
trustee of Dickinson College, and an
original incorporator of the Law School.
One of the first gifts to the school, that of
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$100, was made by him during the year
1890, for the purpose of procuring necessary
furniture and books for the library. He has
always exhibited an interest in its progress,
has attended, though a very busy man all
the annual meetings of the incorporators,
and has been present at all its commencements. He was a business man of remarkable energy and sagacity, a kind
neighbor and a very useful citizen. His
youngest son is at present a member of the
Junior class of the school. We extend to
him and the other members of Mr. Bosler's family our heartfelt sympathy in their
bereavement.
DR. REED'S ILLNESS,
For the past few weeks our worthy President, Geo. Edward Reed, D. D., LL. D.,
has been confined to his home on account
of illness, which is the result of overwork.
At this writing, we are very glad to state
that the Doctor's condition is much improved and that he is on a fair way to a
speedy recovery. That his restoration to
former health and vigor will soon take
place is the earnest hope of every student
of the school.
We think we have never known the
Dickinsonianto quite come up to the standard of excellence which it has attained
this year. A very interesting. feature of it
is the large number of personal notes. It
editors seem to keep in remembrance the
departed alumni, and it is pleasant to be
able to learn of the whereabouts and doings of these, through the columns of this
journal. While the tone and temper of
the editorials are very good, their matter
has been practical and sensible, and their
style clear, terse, and direct. We see no
college periodical that in our opinion surpasses the Dickinsonian, in the qualities
desiderated in a journal of that class. It
was grateful to read in the issue of Nov.
20th the letter from President Reed to the
students. The members of the law school
unite with those of the college in congratulations over what they hope to be his
early recovery.
A. G. Miller, Esq., whose portrait appears on our first page, and who is one of
the leading attorneys of the Cumberland

County Bar, is now the lecturer on Blackstone at the Dickinson School of Law.
Blackstone now holds an important place
in the curriculum of our school. This addition was made this fall to meet an almost
universal demand of the various bars of the
State.
LECTURE OF COL. McCLURE.
On the evening of Monday, November
eighth, Col. A. K. McClure, one of the
leading journalists of the day, gave a lecture in the Court House under the auspices
of Metzger College. His subject was "Personal Reminiscences of Abraham Lincoln." Col. McClure is one of the incorporators of the Dickinson School of Law,
and this fact made his lecture of additional
interest to those connected with the school.
He told his hearers of the peculiar advantage he had in being thrown into personal
contact with our martyred President, being in close affiliation with him both in
adversity and in prosperity. He gave his
audience such an insight into President
Lincoln's character as one would be unable
to get from reading of him. Mr. Lincoln,
he said, was one of the few great men who
did not grow small after having become
acquainted with him, as is the case with so
many prominent men, but constantly grew
greater. He could stand the test of friendship. The lecturer graphically and pathetically told of Mr. Lincoln's trouble with
his cabinet and the leaders of his own political party, things which go to form part
of the unwritten history of our country.
Mr. Lincoln was great, he said, in that he
was grandly human. He bore no one ill
will and could not conceive of any one
cherishing an ill will for him.
After the lecture, an informal reception
was given Col. McClure at the residence of
Prof. 'McKeehan, of the Preparatory
School. An invitation had been extended
to the members of the Law School, and
they had the opportunity and the pleasure
of meeting the veteran editor here.
OPENING OF THE LAW SCHOOL.
The first term of the 1897-8 year of the
Dickinson School of Law was begun on
Wednesday, October 6, 1897. The opening
exercises were held in the lecture hall of
the law school, and were attended by
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nearly one hundred young men and one
young woman, all intent on preparing
themselves for the practice of law. Of the
faculty, there were present Geo. Edward
Reed, D. D., LL. D., President; William
Trickett, LL. D., Dean and Professor of
the Law of Real Property; Hon. Wilbur
F. Sadler, Professor of Criminal Law, Law
of Private Corporations, and Practice;
Hon. J. M. Weakley, Professor of the Law
of Pleading; H. Silas Stuart, Esq., A. M.,
Professor of the Law of Partnership, and
Agency; George Edward Mills, Esq., A.
B., LL. B., Professor of the Law of Torts
and Domestic Relations.
Dr. Reed, the President, one of the foremost orators of America, made the initial
address. The speaker was in excellent
form, and when he had finished his re
marks his fitness for the preeminent place
which fame has accorded him was nmanifest to his audience. The Doctor began
by briefly reviewing the history of the
school, which had its inception in 1834 as
a department of Dickinson College.
The speaker next turned his attention to
the members of the faculty, paying a deserved tribute to their ability and fidelity.
Dr. Reed dwelt in eloquent terms on the
noble character of the profession which
the members of his audience had chosen
for themselves, placing it second to none
excepting possibly, that of the Christian
ministry. He also appealed to the students to maintain a high standard
of morality throughout their college careers and in their subsequent lives.
Dr. Trickett and each member of the
faculty then made brief remarks and announced their respective classes for the
year.

KIND WORDS FOR THE FORUL
In addition to the regular edition of the
June FoRUD there was printed an extra
number of copies for circulation among the
judiciary of the state and the incorlorators and friends of the school. The distribution was made and the following extracts from a few of the letters received by
Dean Trickett show the wide interest that
is taken in the Dickinson School of Law
and its work, especially that of its moot
court.
Judge Williams, of the Supreme Court;

"I acknowledge the receipt of a copy of the
periodical published by the Law School.
I am pleased with it and shall do myself
the pleasure of becoming a subscriber and a
reader."
Judge Orlady, of the Superior Court: "I
have carefully examined the FORUM[ for
June and heartily congratulate all interested parties on the magazine as a whole
and in each of its departments. If the
moot court feature is maintained at the
standard of this record, it will be a very
great benefit to all taking part therein,
and will merit the"favor and interest of all
who have at heart the highest type of professional development."
Ex-Governor Beaver: "I am already a
subscriber to the FoRuM and have followed
with much interest the reports of the moot
court, particularly some of the opinions
which have attracted my attention. The
publication, so far as I can see, is conducted along right lines and is such as will
be greatly useful to the young men in their
work."
Judge Wickham, of the Superior Court:
"The copy of the FoRuMi which you kindly
sent me has interested me very much. It
is evident that you and your 'boys' are
doing good work."
Judge Reed, of the Fifty-fourth Judicial
District: "I have been watching the
progress of the Dickinson Sbhool of Law
with some interest, and take great pleasure in its evident success and prosperity.
I certainly approve of the FoRuM, and
the work therein indicated as being done.
The moot court, as you are conducting it,
cannot fail to be a factor in legal training
that will bring good results, and the
FORUM to preserve the work will largely
eliminate the objectionable farcical character of these courts, and will furnish the
highest incentive for correct and intelligent action and expression of views by
all participants."
"The
Judge Schuyler, of Easton:
FOR Ui is certainly a highly creditable
publication fully up to if not better than
any similar publication I have met. The
reports of cases are admirably well done,
and the 'opinion of the Court,' in addition
to the ability they disclose, are models of
conciseness and clearness. The curse of
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both bar and bench is prolixity, and it is
refreshing to find at least one institution
that has evidently set its face against this
crying evil."
Judge Stewart, Nineteenth Judicial
District: "I have examined the copy of
the FoRuBi kindly sent me and I confess
I am surprised at the thoroughness with
which the work in your moot court is
done. Such work is a very good substitute for actual practice, and will enable
the students to wield the armor with
which they are equipped when they get
into actual engagement. This publication
demonstrates the good work that Dickinson Law School is doing, but I am sure
it could not be otherwise under your competent direction."
The Allison LawSociety began theyear's
work on Wednesday evening, October 13,
when a criminal case was tried, nearly the
entire student body attending. The meeting was presided over by President G. H.
Moyer, who, in a forceful address, expressed
the purposes of the society and welcomed
all new students.
Prof. George Edward Mills, of the Law
School faculty, sat as judge of the case at
bar. The prosecuting attorneys were
Messrs. G. H. Moyer and Charles Shalters.
The counsel for the defendant were Messrs.
C. N. Berntheisel and Charles E. Daniels.
Ajury of six was chosen, and the case then
proceeded to trial. It was lively and interesting, each side having three witnesses.
After the arguments of counsel, Prof. Miller gave a lucid expostulation of the law
governing the case, and the jury retired,
afterwards returning a verdict of "not
guilty, but.pay the costs."
The society has received into membership from the Junior class Messrs. Charles
MeMeans, Daniel Reese, Walter Freed,
Merkel Landis, W. K. Schissler, R. U.
Capwell, J. Kirk Bosler, Charles Weeks,
J. Perry Wood, Charles Moyer and Herman M. Sypherd. The Juniors are being
inducted into the society moot court work
and there receive practical instruction
which prepares them for the School moot
court work which they will have later in
the year. The first case tried by the Juniors was on November 17, when the question of license was argued on the one side

by Messrs. Mchleans and Capwell, and on
the other by Messrs. Freed and Landis.
Of the seven'members of last year's clas
who have returned for the third year course
six are members of the Allison society.
They are Messrs. Barker, Irving, Irwin,
Miller, Feight and Smith. Scott, Vincent,
Hoffman and Hess, of last year's Junior
class, did not return and the society has
lost their services, for all were connected
with it.
G. Frank Wetzel was appointed chairman of the executive committee, vice Mr.
Vincent. The committee is arranging a
series of lectures to be given during the
winter by members of the Cumberland
County Bar. The lectures will be on important legal subjects and will be of incalculable benefit to the students.
The Allison society has among its members many of the hard workers of the
School and a successful season is anticipated.
On Monday, November 8th, the Board
of Examiners of the Cumberland County
Bar held an examination of those candidates for registration as law students who
had filed their applications with Secretary
Miller. The examination was taken by
the following members of the Junior Class:
Messrs. R. H. Light, Lebanon, Pa.; John
G. Miller, Pine Grove Mills, Pa.; Llewellyn
Hildreth, Cape May, N. J.; Walter B.
Freed, Gilbertsville, Pa.; Clarence R. Gilliland, Renovo, Pa.; Chas. R. Weeks, Port
Washington, N. Y.; A. Frank John, Mt.
Carmel, Pa.; J. Perry Wood, Curwensville,
Pa.; Robert P. Stewart, Harrisburg, Pa.;
B. J. McEwen, Kane, Pa.; Charles McMeans, Scranton, Pa.; George W. Coles,
Wiconisco, Pa.; Samuel H. Miller, Wiconisco, Pa.; B. Frank Fenton, Chester, Pa.;
Frank J. Laubenstein, Ashland, Pa.; Marlin Wolf, Shamokin, Pa.; Daniel R. Reese,
Plymouth, Pa.; Garrett Stevens, Reading,
Pa.; Geo. W. Aubrey, Catasauqua, Pa.;
Israel Schelina, Altoona, Pa.; and Miss
Julia Radel, Georgetown, Pa. All were
allowed registration.
Gabriel H. Moyer, '98, of the Fonubr
staff, is quite prominent in political circles
in Lebanon Co. He was hometovote at the
late election.
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THE DICKINSON SOCIETY.
Each successive meeting of the society
increases the interest of its members in
their work. The harmony and good fellowship so well seeded at the first meeting
have ripened into a permanent growth.
On the first Friday of the school term, before a large audience, President A. T. Morgan presiding and Messrs. Thomas Vale,
Caleb Brinton and-H. Silas Stuart acting
as judges, the resolution "That the United
,States Senate has degenerated" wa& ably
debated in the affirmative by Messrs. Caldwell and Hare, and by Messrs. Jordon and
Roth in the negative. The meeting was
the occasion of a cheerful re-union among
the advanced students and a cordial welcome to the Juniors, twelve of whom
directly enlisted in the Dickinson ranks.
On October 15th, Herman Berg, Esq., a
judge. granted a prayer for a compulsory
nonsuit, after an interesting discussion of
the case. Four propositions for membership were received. Upon the argument
of a case, October 22d, Chester C. Bashore,
Esq., in delivering his judicial opinion,
rendered a decision for the defendants.
Among the names of four candidates proposed for membership, that of Miss Julia
Radle, .the cream of the "co-eds," was received amid great applause and enthusiasm.
In the trial of the moot court case argued
on October 29th, Chas. S. Dakin, Esq., a
member of the Cumberland county bar,
sat as judge. The defendant was suecessful. The remarks of President A. T.
Morgan upon the reception of Miss Julia
Radle into the society were unusually sentimental, yet very worthy and appropriate,
and delivered with all his original brilliancy. The argument, on November 5th,
was directed to Messrs. Philip E. Radle,
Martin F. Duffy, and Fred. B. Moser, as
judges. Opinion of the court reserved until
the following meeting, when the verdict
was rendered unanimously in favor of the
plaintiff. The election of a president for
the ensuing term of office was one of the
features of the meeting of November 12th.
Mr. Martin F. Duffy, being the only nominee and a good fellow, was elected to succeed Mr. A. T. Morgan. A popular innovation was the administration of an oath

of office by President Morgan to Presidentelect Duffy. Speeches followed. A cominittee was appointed to consider amendments to the Constitution and By-Laws.
Messrs. Fred. C. Miller, Francis Lafferty,
and Thomas B. Pepper sat as judges in the
trial of the case; no decision at the time.
Another proposition was made for menibership and an executive committee was
appointed, consisting of Messrs. J. Austin
Sullivan, Thomas B. Pepper, and William
A. Jordan. A course of lectures by eminent practitioners is undergoing preparation and from every point of view the
society's outlook is bright and deserving
of the school whose name it bears.

THE SCHOOL.
The Law School has been ably represented on the 'Varsity foot-ball team by
Devall, '98, and Stevens, '99. Both of
whom have distinguished themselves during Dickinson's campaign on the grid-iron
this fall.
Chas. H. Daniels was also home at election time to see his best girl and incidentally to vote.
Samuel B. Hare, '98, has achieved a reputation for fairness and good judgment as
the official referee for Dickinson during the
foot-ball season of '97. Ile has thus won
many friends abroad.
"Dick" is the appropriate name given
to the college mascot, who rejoices in being
a full-blooded Great Dane and who is always in trim for another meal from the
training table.
H. H. Hess, '98, remained with the class
but a few weeks this fall, when he left to
enter Ann Harbor.
Caleb S. Brinton, Esq., of the Cumberland County Bar, has been occupying the
chair of Criminal Law for several weeks,
owing to the forced absence of ex-Judge
Sadler who has been very busily occupied
with his numerous cases in court. Mr.
Brinton is very much liked by the boys,
who are always glad to see him.
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Warren H. Smock, formerly of the class
of '98, is attending the New York Law
School.
Vincent, Livingood, Schmidt and Hoffman, '98 Law, failed to return to school
this fall.
Irving, Irwin, Smith, Miller, Schoener,
Feight and Barker, all of last year's graduating class, have returned to take the
third year course.

A number of the boys appear daily upon
the foot-ball field, while A. M. Devall and
G. B. Stevens have been playing a star
game on the Dickinson 'varsity.
On Friday evening, Nov. 18th, Dickinson Orchestra and Glee Club gave an excellent concert, at Harrisburg before the
Dauphin County Teachers' Institute.
Harry M. Persing, '98, who was compelled, on account of sickness, to leave for
his home, has returned renewed in health.

G. Frank Wetzel, of the FoRmu staff,
made a flying trip to Pittsburg the latter
part of the month. Some say "Wetz"
wanted to miss the F. and M. game but
he says "Nit."

In respect for the memory of J. H. Bosler, Esq., one of the incorporators of the
Law School, whose funeral occurred November 22, no session of the school was
held on that day.

Hare, '98, and Stevens and Sellers, '99,
of the FORUM staff, represent the Law
School on the College Glee Club.

The Junior Class boasts of one co-ed this
year in the person of Miss Julia Radle, of
Georgetown, Pa. Miss Radle has received
a hearty welcome to the school, and we
trust her association with us may prove to
be most pleasant and profitable.

Sadler, '98, witnessed the Penna.-Haryard game in Philadelphia on the 20th.
The Junior class has effected the following organization:
President-FrankB. Sellers, Jr.
Vice President-HermanM. Sypherd.
Secretary-Miss Radle.
Treasurer-W. H. Hartman, Jr.
The following officers have also been
elected by the Junior clam to assist Judge
Sadler in the department of practice:
Judge-Johns.
Prothonotary-Hildreth.
Clerk-of Courts-Laubenstein,
Recorder of Deeds-McCandless.
Register of Wills-Weeks.
Sheriff-Miller.
Justice of the Peace-Saulsbury.
The Law School is, as usual, well represented this year in the Dickinson College
Glee Club and Orchestra. W. Lloyd Snyder is again leader of the orchestra and
Cleon N. Berntheisel, also in the orchestra, is manager. The other members are:
In the orchestra-A. A. Devall, 2nd violin;
C. S. Weeks, flute. In Glee Club-F. B.
Sellers, Jr., second tenor; G. B. Stevens,
first bass, and S. B. Hare and C. S. Weeks,
2nd bass.

In the great game of the season, Saturday, November 20, in which Dickinson's
old rival, Franklin and Marshall was defeated by the overwhelming score of 42 to
0, Devall and Stevens, our star players
from the Law School, distinguished themselves by most excellent work.
During the past few months our library
has been increased by the addition of many
valuable works, among them entire sets of
the Missouri, Michigan and California
Reports.

ALUMNI PERSONALS.
Frank P. Loughran, '93, is one of the
prosecuting attorneys in the case against
Sheriff Martin and hi deputies, growing
out of the recent strike in the coal regions.
John H. Williams, '97, is practicing at
the Luzerne County Bar, and was one of
the counsel for defense in a recent murder
trial. As a result of the splendid effort of
Mr. Williams and his colleague a verdict
of murder in the second degree was found.
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Rush Trescott, '95, Wilkes-Barre, as
chairman of the Democratic Luzerne
County Committee, has shown great organizing ability.
Win. H. Stamey, '96, has been admitted
to practice at the Jefferson County Bar.
He had also been admitted in Franklin
and Lancaster.
A. A. Wingert, '97, is at present principal of the schools of New Albany, Bradford county. He was recently admitted to
the bar of that county.
Francis J. Weakley, '95, of Reynoldsville, broke his leg while practicing (footbail).
Simon Northrup, '96, is at present principal of the schools of Basking Ridge, N.
J.
Frank H. Fay, '96, Altoona, and Richard
J. Goodall, Tyrone, spent a few days in
Carlisle during vacation.
William Francis Shean, '96, figured actively in the recent Democratic campaign,
making a half dozen speeches.
George B. Parker, '96, and Charles W.
Hamilton, '97, have been admitted to the
Allegheny County Bar.
Herman Griswold, '95, and George B.
Somerville, '97, are partners in law at
Athens, Bradford county, Pa. Mr. Somerville was in town on Nov. 28th and 29th.
Mr. A. A. Wingert, class of '97, has been
admitted to the Bradford County bar and
is practicing at New Albany.
H. Clay Beistel, '97, after an ordeal of
two weeks, attained the highest honors in
a preliminary examination before the bar
committee of Westmoreland County. He
was examined with four other graduates
from classical institutions, two of which
were Washington and Jefferson, and
Lafayette. His final examination will
probably occur soon.

Mr. Emil Klingenberg, class of '94, was
admitted to the bar of Michigan shortly
after leaving school on an examination by
a committee of the supreme court of that
state. One of the committee complimented
him upon the thoroughness of his knowledge.
Harvey S. Kiser, '97, is practicing in
Doylestown, Pa.
Henry W. Savidge, '97, who has been in
the telephone construction business will
settle down to his chosen profession next
year. He paid us a welcome visit a few
days ago.
Edmund L. Ryan, '96, who is practicing
at Kane, Pa., spent a few days with us at
the opening of the school.
Thomas K. Leidy has been admitted to
the Berks County Bar.
G. Grant Cleaver, '95, who has been
teaching at Milton, recently recovered
from a severe attack of typhoid fever.
B. H. Campbell, '96, is in Mexico on
legal business.
Joseph F. Biddle, '97, is practicing law
in Bedford, Pa.

THE MOOT COURT.
JAMES BUCHANAN vs. SHAMOKIN
RAILWAY CO.
G. FRANK WETZEL and S. B. SADLER

for the plaintiff cited:
A street railway is a common carrier and
must carry for hire all persons indifferently.
Plaintiff became a lawful passenger upon
entering the car for purpose of transportation, even although he had not yet paid
the fare.-Cleveland v. Steamboat Co., 68
N. Y. 306: Gordon v. Ry. Co., 40 Barb. 546.
It is not necessary, however, that he
should tender the exacf amount of his fare.
He must be ready and willing to pay it in
a reasonable manner, to tender a reasonable
sum, and that sum the defendant is bound
to change if plaintiff does not have exact
fare.-23 Am. Eng. & Ency. of Law, p.
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1017; Thompson Carrier of Persons, 29;
Barrett v. Market St. Ry Co., 81 Cal. 296;
Pickford v. Ry. Co., 8 Meeson-Welsby
372; Fulton v. Gd. T. Ry., 17 U. C. Q. B.
428.
The law cannot prescribe in general what
shall be reasonable in any combination of
facts, so much does depend on the situation
of the parties and the peculiar circumstances of each case. The reasonableness
of the tender is a question for the jury.Starkie on Evidence, 9th Ed. 769 Ry. v.
Wilkes, 68 Texas 617; S. S. N. Bank v.
Sloan, 135 N. Y. 371; Perry v. Ry. 153 Pa.
236; Laird v. Traction Co., 166 Pa. 4.
A railway is liable for the acts of those in
charge of its train in expellinga passenger
from it.-Cain v. Ry., 39 N. W. Ry. 635.
The fact that a passenger is expelled
from the train is of itself ground of recovery
even if no personal injury results.-Ry. v.
Winter, 143 U. S. 60; By. v. Rush, 37 Fed.
Ry. 662.
W. H. SHissLrER and CLEON N. BERNTHEISEL, attorneys for defendant, cited:
1. Entrance into a public conveyance
implies a promise to pay the fare.-Clark
on Contracts 13.
2. A Street Railway Co. may make reasonable regulations for the conducting of its
business.-Central R. R. of N. J. v. Green,
86 Pa. 421;Sullivanv. P .R. Co., 30 Pa.
238; Pittsbtrg etc. B. B. v. McClurg, 56
Pa. 294.
3. A regulation reqiiring the payment
of fare is a reasonable regulation.-Burke
v. R. R. Co. 1 Lack. L. Rec. 108.
4. A tender of a bill of unreasonably
large denomination does not constitute
such a tender of payment as must be accepted by a Street Railway Conductor.Barrett v. Market St. Ry. Co., 81 Cal. 296.
5. A passenger refusing to pay his fare
upon a proper request and demand of the
conductor may be ejected from the ar.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Buchanan boarded a car of the defendant. When the conductor came for the
fare, which was five cents, Buchanan discovered that he had no money with him
other than a ten dollar bill. Offering this,
the conductor declined to change it, and
told Buchanan either to pay the fare, or
to get off. Buchanan refusing to get off,
while tendering the bill and demanding
change, the conductor took hold of him,
and with such force as was necessary
ejected him from the car.
Bucaanan brings this action of trespass.
The jury have awarded him $200 damages,.
subject to the opinion of the Court whether
as a matter of law the conductor was justified.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

James Buchanan boarded a car of the
defendant company. When the conductor
came for the fare, which was five cents,
Buchanan discovered that he had no
money with him other than a$10 bill. On
his offering this, the conductor declined to
change it, and told Buchanan either to pay
the fare or to get off. Buchanan refusing
to get off, the conductor, while he was
tendering the bill and demanding change,
took hold of him and with such force as
was necessary, ejected him from the car.
The jury have given him a verdict for
$200, and on the reserved point, we are to
decide whether judgment is to be entered
thereon.
It is well settled that if a passenger declines to pay his fare on proper demand
when on a railroad or railway car, an omnibus or other vehicle of a common carrier,
he may be ejected. The carrier is not compelled to complete the transportation for
him and sue him for the fare.
Buchanan was willing to pay the fare,
provided that the car conductor should
give him $9.95 in exchange for the $10 bill.
He was not obliged to tender the exact
fare. The rule concerning tender of a sum
of money to discharge an already matured
debt does not extend to the tender of a
fare, the object of which is to secure the
right to the completion of thejourney. Barrett v. Market St. R. Way Co., 81 Cal. 296;
Barker v. Central Park, etc., R. R. Co. 151
N. Y. 237.
But, it does not follow that the vahie of
the money tendered may diverge to any
extent from the fare. The value of a piece
of money may be so much in excess of the
fare that it would not be reasonable to expect the conductor to be prepared to change
it. The difficulty, in so far as there is a
difficulty, is in fixing the point at which
the obligation to change ceases, and in
determining whether the court or the jury
is to fix it. Two respectable courts have
differed as to the reasonableness of expecting the conductor to take from a $5 bill or
gold piece a fare of five cents, the Supreme
Court of California affirming, Barrett v.
Market St. Railway Co. 81 Cal. 296; and
the court of Errors and Appeals of New
York denying it; Barker v. Central Park
R. B. Co. 151N. Y. 237. The former court
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permitted, the,latter refused a recovery by
the passenger who had been ejected for
not tendering a less amount.
Even the California court concedes that
it would not be reasonable to require the
conductor to change a 20 or a 50 dollar
piece. In Fulton v. Grand Trunk R. R.
Co. 17 U. C. Q B. 428, it was decided that
the conductor was not obliged to take from
a $20 gold piece a fare of $1.35, and that on
the passenger's refusing to offer a less sum
he could lawfully expdl him from the car,
but the car was a steam railroad car.
The explanation of the tender of the $10
is furnished by the evidence of the plaintitff
He had no other money with him. Had
he had less money, he would have had no
excuse for insisting on the conductor's
changing this. The conductor, however,
furnishes no explanation of his declining to
change the $10. Had he the money in his
pocket with which he might have done so
without embarrassment to him during the
later portion of the day? Or did he perversely and wantonly refuse to accommodate the passenger? The evidence shows
no rule of the company prohibiting the
changing of sums as large as $10. We
think there should have been such an explanation of the conductor's .refusal to
change as would have shown its reasonableness. If he had not enough small
money to make this change, and the change
that in the after part of the day he would
probably be expected to make, his refusal
was, we think, just. But, on the other
hand, if his pockets were full of small
change, if the day was far spent and there
was every probability that he would be
able to meet all the demands for change
which would be made on him until his
day's work was ended, we think his refusal
improper.' A large latitude of discretion
should be allowed him in determining
whether there was this probability, but it
ought to appear that his declination to
make the change was in the exercise of
what seemed to him a duty, and not the
result of perverseness and churlishness. It
is a serious thing to apply force to a respectable passenger and to eject him from the
car. The justification of such acts ought
to be manifest.
We are aware that in Barker v. Central
Park etc. R. R. Co., supra the court do not

seem to have considered the state of the
conductor's pocket, in deciding that he was
excused from makingthe change. But the
rule required him to make change up to $2,
impliedly forbidding the change of a larger
sum. Under such arule--which, if made,
might be reasonable-the conductor's refusal to make a particular change might
be justifiable, while, without it, it would be
without excuse. We think it wise, in the
absence of a general rule, to require evidence that the conductor's refusal to make
change was not the result of mere wantonness and disobligiugness.
Judgment will be entered on the verdict.

GEORGE SAND vs. JACOB MARTIN
ET AL.
Trespass.
J. B. THOMPSON CA rDWELL and FRED.
B. MOSER for the plaintiff.
1. The acts of such labor organizations
are invalid when unlawful means are em)loyed to carry out their ends.-Reg, v.
Rowlands, 17 Adol. & Ellis, 671; Carew v.
Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1; State v. Stewart,
59 Vt. 273; State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46;
Com. v. Hunt, 45 Mass. 111. Ortoimpoverish third persons.-People v. Fisher, 14
Wend. 9; Rigby v. Connol, 14 Ch. Div.
482; Hornby -v.Close, L. R. 2 Q. B. 153.
They must not encourage breach of contract.-Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555;
Van Horn v. Van Horn 52 N. J. Law 284;
Boston Glass Mfg. v. hBinney, 21 Mass.
425; State v. Donaldson, 32 N. J. Law 151.
They must not be against public policy.Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co.,
68 Pa., 173; Nester, v. Brewing Co., 161
Pa. 491.
2. Workmen may not by their combination stifle all competition but must leave
labor free like any other commodity.Moore v. Bennet, 140 Ill. 69; Collins v.
Locke, 4 App. Cases 674; Lucke v. Knights
of Labor, 19 L. R. A. 408; State v. Loomis,
21 L. R. A. 790; Godcharles v. Wigeman,
113 Pa. 431. Constitutionality of acts '69,
'72, '76, and '93 questioned.-Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa. 420.
CLAUDE L. ROTH and MAINiI F.
DlUFFY for the defendants.
If disturbance or loss come as a result of
competition or the exercise of like rights
by others, it is damnum absque injuria.Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; Boston
Glass Mfg. v. Binney, 21 Mass. 425; Raycroft v. Taynton, 68 Vt. 219; Hunt v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 583; Jenkins v. Fowler, 24
Pa. 308; Adler v. Fenton, 65 U. S. 412;
Rogers v. Evart, 17 N. Y. Supp. 246. De-
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fendants were exercising a right and are
not liable.-Act of June 16, 1891; Act of
April 20, 1876- Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa.
420; State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163; Carew
v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 14; Bohn Mfg.
Co. v. Lumbermen's Asso., 54 Minn. 223,
21 L. R. A. 337- Bowen v. Matheson, 96
Mass. 499; Walsby v. Auley, 7 Jur. U. S.
465; Com. v. Hunt, 45 Mass. 111; Com. v.
Vallette, 15 Phila. 393 Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell, 26 6 r. 527, 28 L. R. A.
464; Snow v. Wheeler, 113 Mass. 179; State
v. Donaldson, 32 N. J. L. 157.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Martin and six others were combined
into a Brewery Working Men's Association, of the city of Lancaster. The brewers
of the same city were also formed into the
Brewers' Association. In order to avoid
disputes between themselves and their
workingmen, they agreed with the B. W.
A. that they would continue no longer
than three weeks to employ any man who
was not and did not become a member of
the latter, if opportunity was afforded him.
Sand, not a member of the latter, was employed by the day on Aug. 7, 1895, by
Thomas Adler, a member of the Brewers'
Association, and continued in such employ
until Oct. 17, 1895. On Aug. 12, 1895, Martin, as a committee of the B. W. A., invited him to join that association. He
declined. Five days later the invitation
was renewed with notice that if he refused
to join, the Association would insist that
Adler should live up to his agreement, as
a member of the B. A., and discharge him,
Sand. Sand remaining recusant, Martin
expostulated with Adler, who advised
Sand to relieve him of trouble by joining
the B. W. A. This association charged a
monthly due of 2-5 cents, and required attendance at the monthly meetings, where
the interests of the members were considered. It undertook to prescribe the minimum wages for which its members should
work, and to direct its members to refuse
to.work for specified brewers who had refused to heed the representations made to
it, as to wages, hours of employment, and
classes of persons to be employed. Adler,
in consequence of the representations of
Martin, dismissed Sand on the 17th of
Octoberj 1895, for refusing to join the B.
W. A. He was unable to find employment for five months, when he found it at
a differeut class of work, but for the same
wages.
His wages for the 5 months

would have amounted to $250. In this
action of trespass Sand asks to recover at
least the wages lost.
The-facts on which Sand can recover, if
at all, are the following: (1.) His dismissal from Adler's employ on Oct. 17, 1895.
(2.) The sequence of this dismissal, upon a
joint request from Martin, et al. (3.) The
compact between the Brewers' Association
and the Brewery Workingmen's Association, which gave force to this request. (4.)
The former imminence of disputes, the
avoidance of which led to the compact,
and, whose recurrence would doubtless follow the breach of that compact. Is there
in any of these or in all of them a cause of
action?
Sand was employed from day to day.
No contract bound Adler on the evening
of Oct. 17, 1895, to employ him the next
day or week or month. As against Adler
he had no right to be continued in employment.
Had he a right as against Martin that
his employment should not cease in consequence of Martin's request? There are
many causes that would justify a request
by A to B, not to employ C. C might be
immoral, a bad workman, personally hostile to A. Though W's inducement of X
not to make a purchase from Y, by means
of fraud, may be actionable,Rice v. Manley,
66 N. Y. 82, Benton v. Pratt, 2 Wend. 385,
the use of persuasions not founded on fraud,
would surely not be. To make actionable
such persuasions would be in the highest
degree quixotic. Sand was offering his
labor for sale, and Martin induced Adler
to decline to accept it. In this act of Martin, followed by that consequence, we find
no actionable tort.
Does the fact that the request of Martin
was efficacious because of the previous
agreement between the Brewers' Association, of which Adler was a member, and
the B. W. A. of which Martin, et al. were
members, make the request and its consequence a ground of action? How could it?
Agreement in general not to employ any
not members of the B. W. A. followed by
Adler's refusal to employ Sand, at Martin's
request, because he was not a member of
the B. W. A. can surely no more entitle
Sand to redress, than could the request
not to employ him, for that reason, not
preceded by silch an agreement.
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Is there anything in the motives by
which Martin and his associates induced
Adler to enter into the agrdement, that
makes the dismissal of Sand tortious?
The agreement was made by Adler's association "in order to avoid disputes between
themselves and their workingmen." Disputes are too common between employers
and employees. They are always disagreeable. At times they become disastrous.
What worthier object than their avoidance? And if peace can be brought between A and his workmen, by his agreeing not to employ men who are in their
opinion pursuing policies inimical to their
interests, why should such an agreement
not be made, and if made, why should it
not be honestly observed? The employer
is not bound to employ everybody. He
has already 10, 20, 50 hands. He agrees
that he will not consult his own fancy
only, but theirs also, in the future employment of men. He will make them
co-councilors, partners, with him, in their
selection. He will not engage those whose
engagement they, for specified reasons,
veto. The object sought by him is wise,
and the means not legally reprehensible.
What the exact character of the disputes
was, to escape which Adler and his associates made their compact with the B.
W. A., does not appear. We must surmise it.
Let us suppose then, that the
B. W. A. objected to the employment
of non-association men, and intended,
should such men be employed by their
employers, to unitedly refuse to work for
them. Let us suppose that it was to avoid
this result, that Adler et al. entered into
the agreement, and that Adler observed
this agreement in respect to Sand. Are
there in these facts, elements giving a
tortious cast to the act of Martin et al?
It is very likely that until recent times
the combinations of the defendants to desert the employment of an employee would
have been criminally punishable under
the law of Pennsylvania. Coin. v. Carlisle,
Brightly 36; cf. State v. Donaldson, 3 Vr.
151. The law of Massachusetts was probably more liberal; Commonwealth v.
Hunt, 4 Metc. 111. Such acts are no longer
indictable in this state; Act 8 May, 1869;
June 14, 1872; April 20, 1876; June 16, 1891,
2 P. & L. 2913-2918, Cote v. Murphy, 159

Pa. 420; Buchanan v. Kerr, 159 Pa. 433.
Indeed such an act is "lawful" 159 Pa. 425.
The worst that can be assumed then, is
that Adler's workingmen combined to desert him in case he should continue to employ a non-association man, and to avoid
this result, he agreed that he would never
employ longer than three weeks a nonassociation man. It was "lawful" for
them to desert him if he did. Surely it
was lawful then, for them to forewarn him
that they would desert if he continued to
employ Sand, a non-association man.
They in substance said to him, if you
want to buy our labor, you must not buy
Sand's. This did not interfere with
Adler's free choice. He could take the
labor that seemed most useful to him, that
of Sand or theirs. In a case in which
lumber dealers conspired not to furnish
lumber and to induce others not to furnish
lumber to A. if he in turn sold any to such
contractors and builders as acceded to the
demands of their masons, carpenters, etc.,
for higher wages, Justice Dean remarked
of the combination: "It does not interfere
with the dealer's (the plaintiff's) free
choice; it may have prompted him to a
somewhat sordid calculation; he may have
considered which custom was most profitable, and have acted accordingly; but this
was not such coercion and threats as constituted the acts of the combination unlawful." Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa. 420; 431.
If the dealer who found the market closed
to him by a confederacy, because he chose
not to join it in assisting to defeat a strike
of workmen,could recover no damages from
the members of this confederacy, it is difficult to see how Sand can recover damages
because he has been shut out of the Adler
market for his labor, on account of his refusal to assist the workingmen in maintaining a strong positidn of defence over
against their employers.
The plaintiff has cited the case of Lucke
v. Clothing Cutters, (Md.) 19 L. R. A.
408, as being substantially like the present
ease. The defendant association caused
an employer to dismiss a cutter because he
was a non-union man, but they refused to
admit him, on application intotheirunion.
That ease affirms that the inducement by
several persons, employees of A. to desert
his employment, if he continues to employ
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X, followed by the dismissal of X, is an
actionable wrong against X. We have
already indicated that we find ourselves
unable to follow it.
Still more formidable, is the authority
of Curran v. Galen, in 152 N. Y. 33, in
which on facts quite similar to this case,
the court of errors held that the dismissed
workingman could recover damages from
those who had occasioned his dismissal.
We think the change of policy in this
state, manifested in the acts of assembly
already cited, makes no longer actionable,
the procurement of the dismissal from
service of a non-union man by union men,
by means of the apprehension of a simultaneous and concerted strike.
The verdict of the jury therefore must
be for the defendants.
SAMUEL HAWKER v. CHAS. BOYCE.
MARTIN R. HERR and ADAIR HERM1AN
for the plaintiff.
1. The general rule of law is that fixtures become part of the land to which
they are annexed.-Lemar v. Miles, 4
Watts 330; White v. Arndt, 1 Wharton,
91; Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 W. & S. 116.
Tenant may not remove after the expiration of his term.-Darrah v. Baird, 101
Pa. 270; Daris v. Moss, 2 Wright, 346;
Overton v. Williston, 7 Casey, 155.
2. Procee.dings for partition may be instituted and maintained only by one having an estate in possession of the premises
to be partitioned.-Brownell v. Brownell
et at., 19 Wend. 367; Richard v. Richard et
al., 13 Pick. 251; Bowner v. Kennebeck
Purchase, 7 Mass. 475.
MILES H. MURR and FRANcIs LAFFERTY for the defendant.
1. A co-tenant is liable for repairs and
improvements made by another co-tenant
with his assent.-Duche's appeal, 57 Pa.
467; Young v. Polock, 3 Cal. 209.
2. An equitiable partition may be made
so as to assign a portion of the land on
which improvements have been made to
him who made them.-Brookfield v. Williams, 2 N. J. Eq., 341; Obert v. Obert et.
al., 5 N. J. Eq., 397; Dowaday v. Crowell,
11 N. J. Eq., 201; Hall v. Piddock, et. at.,
21 N. J. Eq., 311; Crofts v. Crofts, -13 Gray,
360; Seals v. Sato, 35 Cal. 102; Green v.
Putman, 1 Barb. 500; Wetherill v. Warren,
6 Phila. 182; St. Felix v. Rankin, 3 Edw.
Ch. 323; Conklin v. Conklin, 3 Sandf. Ch.,
65.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Grove Brown owned a tract of land on
which was an ore bank. He leased an un-

divided one-half of this land to Charles
Boyce for five years from 1st April, 1890,
with the privilege in Boyce to purchase
the undivided one-half at any timewithin
the five years. Boyce was to have the
privilege of removing within the five years
any machinefy and fixtures he might put
on the premises in case he did not purchase. On 17th June, 1893, Boyce, exercising his option, accepted a deed from
Brown for the undivided one-half. Brown
subsequently, on 13th Feb., 1894, conveyed
the other one-half to Hawker. The machinery and improvements cost $550.00;
and they increased the selling value of the
premises to the same amount.
A bill was by Hawker filed on Sept. 11,
1896 for partition. The Court ordered sale
and the land sold for $2740.00, including
the increment of $550.00.
Hawker contends that he must receive
one-half of $2740.00.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The sale did not take place until after
the expiration of the lease. Although by
its terms, and by the law in the absence
of stipulation, the tenant may remove trade
fixtures within the term, the machinery
was in this case not removed within that
time. Before the expiration of the term
Boyce had become the owner of an undivided half of the land. From that time,
or at least from the end of the five years,
we think, he must be supposed to have
annexed the machinery to the land as an
owner in fee of it. He cannot claim the
value of it as tenant.
As tenant in common with Hawker,
Boyce then adds machinery and improvements to the land. Hawker appeals
to equity to make a partition. Division
of the land being impracticable, a sale of
it is decreed. It is ascertained that the
improvements have increased the value of
the land by 550. The land thus increased
in value, has sold for $2740. Must $550 be
deducted from this sum and given to
Boyce, the remainder only being divided
equally between him and Hawker, or
must Hawker take one-half of the sum
that represents the increment of value
caused by the improvements?
For the increase of value, caused by the
improvements, Boyce could not recover
compensation in a personal action against
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Hawker or his predecessor, Brown.
Beatty v. Bordwell, 91 Pa. 438; Gress v.
Patterson, 9 W. & S. 197. Nor could he
exclude Hawker from the joint possession
until he was reimbursed. Crest v. Jacks,
3 W. 238. As co-tenant Hawker could
have insisted on co-possession of the land
with all its annexations. So far as appears, he has been admitted into this joint
possession.
He claims not simply to
jointly possess the land, but on its sale, to
take one-half of the increment occasioned
by the improvements put on it by Boyce.
This is a partition in equity. In such a
proceeding, "' if it should appear that one
of the parties had made improvements on
the land of which the partition is sought,
he will be awarded suitable compensation." 3 Pomeroy Eq. Jurisp, .1389. This
compensation will be made, either by alloting to the improving tenant the land
on which the improvements are, at their
value minus the improvements, or if a sale
is made, allowing him to take from the
fund prior to division, the sum representing the added value, up to the amount of
his expenditures, or otherwise. Doughady v. Crowell, 11 N. J. Eq., 201; Hall v.
Piddock, 21 N. J. Eq.; 311, St. Felix v.
Rankin, 3 Edw. Ch. 233; Conklin v. Conklin, 3 Sandf. Ch. 65. In Ford v. Knapp,
102 N. Y. 135, a co-tenant was allowed the
value of improvement to a mill. While it
would be inequitable to exclude Hawker
from the joint occupancy of all the land
because Boyce had put machinery on it,
it would on the other hand be inequitable,
on a sale of the land, to permit Hawker to
take a share of the product of the improvements to which he did not contribute.
Had he allowed Boyce to be in sole possession, he could not have exacted from Boyce
that portion of the rents and profits that
was produced by these improvements.
George v. Patterson, 9 W. & S. 197, Cf. Luck
v. Luck, 113 Pa. 256.
In the case of Cosgriff v. Foss, 152 N.
Y., 104, in many respects similiar to this,
the court of errors of New York decided
that the improving co-tenant, who had
been a tenant with an option to purchase,
and who had purchased, could not appropriate to himself exclusively the proceeds
of his improvements, in the partition sale.
But, it is said in the opinion, it does not

appear "to what extent the value of the
premises was increased, or, unless inferentially, that they would sell for any more
on account of the improvements." The
improvements of Boyce not only cost $550
but they have added $550 to the selling
value of the premises. It does not appear
that Hawker and Boyce have not been in
joint possession of the land. Hence, it
does not appear that Boyce has been appropriating to himself exclusively the profits of the land and of the improvements.
Perhaps, had this appeared and had it also
appeared that Boyce had not consented to
Hawker's sharing these profits, he would
have had no equitable right to exclusively
appropriate the $550. We think that the
circumstance that his outlays added $550
to the price for which the land sold, constitutes, primafacie,an equity in him to
take that amount from the proceeds. No
facts appear sufficient to overcome this
apparent equity.
A decree will be drawn up allowing to
Boyce $550, and equally dividing the residue of the price for which the land sold,
between him and Hawker.
JOHN OLCOTT vs. PENN. RAILROAD
COMPANY.
Trespass. Motion for a new trial.
GABRIEL H. MoYER and CHARLES E.
DANIELS for the plaintiff.
1. Defendant's duty to signal the approach of the train.-P. & R. R. R. v. Killips, 88 Pa. 405; Ellis v. Lake Shore R. R.,
138 Pa. 506; Penn. R. R. v. Barnett, 59 Pa.
264. Flagman.-Laib v. P. R. R., 180 Pa.
509. Safety Gates.-Robertsv. Del. & Hud.
Canal Co., 177 Pa. 183. Ordinance was
properly admitted-Lederman et. ux. v.
P. R. R. Co., 165 Pa. 118; P. R. R. Co. v.
Lewis, 79 Pa. 33. Evidence of intoxication
properly excluded.-Am. & Eng. Ency. of
Law, Vol. 4, page 79.
2. Under the circumstances, the case was
properly submitted to the jury.-Davidson
v. RNvy. Co., 179 Pa. 227, 171 Pa. 522; Newhard v. R. R. Co., 153 Pa. 418; Haveistick
v. P. R. R., 171 Pa. 101; Gray v. P. R. R.,
172 Pa. 383; Philpott v. Penn. R. R., 175
Pa. 570; Penn. R. R. v. Ogier, 11 Casey60.
RuEL U. CAPWELL and J. HARVEy
LINE for the defendant company.
1. The Court erred in excluding the evidence as to intoxication.-Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. 4, page 78; Penn R, R.
Co. v. Bell, 122 Pa. 58.
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2. The Court should have directed the
jury to find for the defendant, as a matter
of law.-Greenwood v. Phila. W. & B. R.
R. Co., 124 Pa. 572; Blight v. R. R. Co.,
143 Pa. 10; Myers v R. R. Co., 150 Pa. 386:
Lees v. P. R. PR. R 154 Pa. 46; Sheehan v.
P. R. B. R. 166 Pa. 354; Gray v. Penn.
R. R., 172 Pa. 384; Seamans v. D. L. &W.
R. R., 174 Pa. 421; Hovendun v. Penn. R.
R., 180 Pa. 244; Central R. R. v. R. R. Co.,
81 Pa. 2.6;Sullivan v. N. Y. L. E. &W. R.
175 Pa. 361; Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Brandtmaier, 113 Pa. 610.
STATENMNT OF FACTS.

The defendant railroad runs through a
populous city, crossingseveral streets. On
one of these, Duke Street, Abram Wolcott
was driving a wagon on third of Jan., 1894.
at I P. B., and in going across tracks was
struck by a train and killed. No wife survived him, and his only son was John 01cott, 35 years of age. The day of the accident was clear, and the view of the track
from the crossing was unobstructed. The
train was moving at the rate of ten miles
an hour, and an ordinance of the city prohibits a greater speed than four miles.
Two witnesses testified that Abram 01
cott stopped before venturing on the track
and looked in both directions. As to listening, there was no other evidence. At the
crossing no signal was given, and the flagman ordinarily there was for the space of
ten minutes absent from necessity. A witness for the defendant said that he saw
Abram Olcott get into his wagon about
half a block from the crossing, that he
staggered somewhat and stumbled when
he mounted the wagon; that he was convinced from his manner of moving and
holding his body that he was intoxicated.
On objection by the plaintiff, this evidence
was stricken out. A verdict for plaintiff
for $5000. This is a motion for new trial.
OPINION OF COURT.

The defendant assigns various causes for
a new trial.
We think there was sufficient evidence
of negligence on the part of the Railroad
Co. to justify the submission of it to the
jury.

The rate of speed of moving trains should
be adjusted to the degree of danger of collisions with persons properly crossing the
tracks. The bnore populous the neighborhood, the less the practicable velocity will
be. It was proper to allow the jury tosay

whether the rate of ten miles per hour in
a populous city was excessive. Ellis v.
Lake Shore R. R. Co., 138 Pa. 506; Lehigh
Valley R. R. v. Brandtmaier, 113 Pa. 610;
Pa. R. R. v. Lewis, 79 Pa. 33; Reeves v.
Del. Lack. & W. R. R., 30 Pa. 454.
The ordinance of the city restricting the
rate of running trains to four miles per hour
was admitted in evidence. The propriety
of the reception of an ordinance of this kind
seems to be predicated upon its furnishing
evidence of negligence.-Lane v. Atlantic
Works, 111 Mass. 136. In Lederman v.
Pa. R. R. 165 Pa. 118, proof of such an
ordinance was received by the court, not
as "per se evidence of negligence"ibut because it "may be considered in ascertaining whether the train was being run negligently," (p. 120). "It may be," says Livingstone, J., "taken into consideration by
the jury, with other evidence, in ascertaining whether or not the cars on July 3,
1891, were run at too high and dangerous
a rate of speed when this accident occurred." This seems to mean that while
the mere breach of the ordinance would
not justify the assumption that the speed
of the train was negligent, it may corroborate other evidence that such speed is
negligent. How it does so, precisely, does
not appear, unless the ordinance is to be
taken as expressing the opinion of the ordaining power, as to a safe speed, and unless this opinion is admissible. In Lederman v. Pa. B. R. the action of the common
pleas was approved by the supreme court.
In Pa. R. R. v. Lewis, 79 Pa. 33, the ordinance was admitted, sub silentio.
Whether signals should be given and
flagmen maintained at crossings, depending as it does on circumstances, must be
determined by the jury. Pittsburg etc. R.
R.v. Dunn 56 Pa. 280; Lehigh Valley R.
R. v. Brandtmaier 113 Pa. 610; Haverstick v. Pa. R. R. 171 Pa. 101, Laib v. Pa.
R. R. 180 Pa. 503. So, an old and decrepit
flagman being employed, the jury may
determine whether the railroad ought to
have had a more efficient man. Lederman v. Pa. R. It. 165 Pa. 118. The flagman ordinarily here was absent for the
space of ten minutes, during which the
accident on which this suit is based, happened. It was necessary to suomit to the
jury the decision of the question whether
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the absence of the flagman was imputable
as negligence to the company. In Phil. &
R. R. R. v. Kellip 88 Pa. 405, itwas for the
jury to say whether the withdrawal for a
space of time of the watchman, and the
leaving of the gate open, was negligenceIt might be more ilegligent, to temporarily withdraw-a watchman, than to refrain altogether from maintaining hini.
We cannot discover error in the trial, so
far as the negligence of the defendant is
concerned. Is there error, as respects the
contributing negligence of the deceased?
That negligence of the deceased would
bar a recovery by the plaintiff is unquestionable. Cases so implying or affirming
are too numerous to justify citation.
In the effort to show his negligence, the
testimony of a witness was produced, to
the effect that a short time before the accident he had seen the deceased, in attempting to mount his wagon, stagger and
stumble, and that from his manner of
moving and carrying his body, he became
convinced that Abram Olcott was intoxicated. This evidence was subsequently
struck out. Was this error? It was not
offered by the plaintiff to exempt the deceased from the duty of exhibiting as much
care as he should have done if sober. Intoxication could not lessen the care incumbent on him. Penna. R. R. v. Bell,
122 Pa. 58. But it was shown by the defendant. In what light was it evidence?
Surely it did not lessen the care which
was incumbent on the railroad company.
If relevant at all, it seems to be relevant
only as tending to show that the deceased
did not exhibit the requisite care. In
Wynn. v. Allard, 5 W. & S. 524, proof of
the drunkenness of the defendant, sued
for driving his vehicle againsta pedestrian
was justified because the evidence as to his
negligence being "nearly balanced, the
fact of drunkenness might turn the scale,
inasmuch as a man partially bereft of his
faculties would be less observant than if
he were sober, and less regardful of the
safety of others." In Felska v. N. Y.
Central R. R 152 N. Y. 339, the materiality
of the drunkenness of. the plaintiff, was
assumed without explanation. We have
concluded that the evidence of drunkenness ought to have been allowed to stand.
The opinion of the witness was admissible.
152 N. Y. 339.

The defendant contends that it was error
to submit its liability to the jury. The
day of the accident was clear. The accident occurred at 1 P. x. The view of the
track from the crossing was unobstructed.
Two witnesses testify however, that Abram
Olcott stopped beforeventuring on the track
and looked in both directions. Without
proof of the contraryOlcott will be assumed
to have theusual faculties of sightand hearing. Was iterrorthentoallow the jury to
determine that Olcot stopped and looked,
and because he saw and heard nothing,
attempted to cross. Or must the court say
that either he did not stop, look and listen,
or he attempted to cross despite the approach of the train of which he thus became aware?
For some years past, the courts have
taken judicial notice of the ordinary
strength of the faculties of sight and hearing, of the time necessary to cover a distance by a train running at an ascertained
rate, and of the consequent ability of the
deceased person, in clear weather and in
the absence of obstructions, to see and hear
the approaching train before he crossed
the track. If the rate of motion is such
that when the crossing began the train
must have been so near as to be observable
by a man of the usual visual power, the
courts declare that he either did not use
this power or that he crossed in defiance of
what its exercise revealed to him. Among
the very numerous cases, it is enough to
cite these: Gray v. Pa. R. R. 172 Pa. 384;
Bleght v. R. R. Co. 143 Pa. 10; Myers v.
R. R. Co., 150 Pa. 386; Sheehan v. P. & R.
R. R., 166 Pa. 354; Holden v. Pa. R. R.,
169 Pa. 1; Carroll v. R. R. Co., 12 W. N.
C. 348; Pa. R. R. v. Bell, 122 Pa. 64; Marland v. Pittsb. etc. R. R., 123 Pa. 487.
In Sheehan v. P. & R. R. R., the collision itself is said to be conclusive proof that
the deceased went upon the track immediately in front of the approaching
train and in Holden v. Pa. R. R. 169 Pa. 1,
Green, J., declares that "the fact of the
immediate collision conclusively proves
that he (the deceased) did not exercise his
senses as to the approaching train." At
the rate of ten miles an hour, the defendant's train was travelling one-sixth of a
mile or 880 feet per minute. If the crossing took two minutes, and the collision
occurred just as the rear of the wagon was
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leaving the track, the train was 1760 feet
distant when the crossing commenced. A
man with good vision, near mid-day of a
clear day, could see on an unobstructed
track indefinitely farther than this, and the
courts take judicial cognizance of this
ability. They will not allow ajury to find
that the fact is different from what it
must have been. We think we should
have informed the jury that it was impossible for the deceased to have looked
and listened without seeing the train,
that he, therefore, either did not look and
listen, or attempted to cross despite the
oncoming train, and that he was therefore
negligent.
If the evidence raised a doubt as to
whether had the deceased stopped, looked
and listened, he would have seen the cars,
the question would have been unavoidably
for the jury. -Laib v. Pa. R. R. Co., 180
Pa. 503. We cannot see that any doubt is
in this case possible.
It may not be inappropriate to add that
the negligence of the railroad, in not having, at the moment, a flagman at the crossing, does not dispense the deceased from
the duty of stopping, looking and listening.
Lake Shore etc. R. R. v. Frantz, 127 Pa.
297. The almost countless cases which exact stopping, looking and listening are cases
in which there was some negligence of the
railroad. Pa. R. R. v. Ogler, 35 Pa. 60
must not be understood to validate a contrary doctrine.
After considering the unusually able argument of counsel on both sides, we are
constrained to award a new trial.
PATRICK QUINN vs. CARLISLE OPERA
HOUSE COMPANY.
Action in Trespass.
JACKSON 0. HAAS and HARRY M. PERSING for plaintiff.
1. The mere happening of an injury
raises the presumption of want of care and
throws on the carrier the burden of disproving it.-Tenney v. Pippinger, 1 Phila.

W4.
2. Hey v. Phila., 81 Pa. 44; Sullivan v.
P. & R. R. R. Co., 30 Pa. 234.
3. Defendant's knowledge of condition
of steps is immaterial.-Currie v. Boston
Music Hall Association, 135 Mass. 414.
4. The parties were not bound to equal
degrees of vigilance.-Pittsburg City v.
Grier, 22 Pa. 54; Gray et al. v. Scott, 66

Pa. 345; Priest v. Nicholls, 116 Mass. 401;
Marble v. Ross, 124 Mass. 44; Pa. R. R.
Co. v. Ogrin, 35 Pa. 60; Wendell v. Baxter, 12 Gray, 494.
EDwIN G. HUTCHINSON and WA.LTR
G. TREIBLY for defendant.
1. The burden is upon the plaintiff to
show negligence.--Baker v. Fehr, 97 Pa.
70; Beatty v. Gilmore 16 Pa 463; Federal
Street and Pleasant alley R. R. Co. v.
Gibson, 96 Pa. 83.
2. There were no consequences flowing
from the alleged negligence of defendant.
-Hart v. Allen, 2 Watts 114.
3. Defendant had no notice of the defect.
-Southcote v. Stanley, 1 H. & N. 247;
Welfare v. London and B. Ry. Co., L. R.
4 Q. B. 693.
4. The evidence establishes the contributory negligence of plaintiff.-R. R. Co. v.
Gladmon, 15 Wallace, 401; Del., Lack. &
W. R. R. Co. v. A. E. Cadow, 120 Pa. 559;
Berry v. Penna. R. R. Co., 48 N. J. L.
141; Cooley on Torts, p. 673.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

After attending an entertainment in the
Carlisle Opera House,Quinn while descending the stairs, tripped, was pitched down
the stairs, and sustained injury. The stairs
were partially covered with layers of rubber. The evidence was that Quinn tripped
on the fifth or fourth step above the
landing, and fell to the landing, that
the rubber was loose on the sixth step,
wrinkled, and nails out of it, and hat
shoes might be caught in it. At the time
of the accident Quinn had just shaken
hands with a friend, and was talking loud
and laughingly. The court was requested
by defendant to say to the jury, there could
be no recovery. (1.) Because no proof of
defendant's negligence. (2.) No proof of
negligence conducing to accident. (3.) No
notice to defendant sufficiently long before
the accident to have made steps for avoidance of it possible. (4.) Contributory negligence of plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

1. The evidence of the defendant's negligence is that of the fact that the rubber
strip on the sixth step was loose, and wrinkled, that nails were out of it, and that
shoes might be caught in it. Might the
jury properly infer, from these circumstances, the negligence of the defendant ?
They are not per se decisive of negligence. It is conceivable that the nails had
been drawn out of the rubber maliciously
by some one, so short a time before the
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happening of the accident, that the utmost
vigilance of the defendant could not have
detected the fact. The nature of the uses
to which the building was put however
imposed the duty of a very high degree of
care on the Opera House Company to prevent accidents similar to that which befell
Patrick Quinn. The condition of the
stairs, if purposely caused by it; or if suffered to continue, after notice of it, would
we think require of any jury a verdict of
negligence. The building is in the custody
of the defendant. None have access to it,
except for the time during which entertainments are being given in it. The
plaintiff has not the means of knowing
how long this defect in the stairway has
existed, what efforts to detect and rectify
such defects were made by the defendant,
or what the occasion of it was. The state
of the stair should cast on the defendant
the duty of repelling negligence on his
part. In Scott v. Lock Co., 3 H. & C.,
596, Wharton, Neg. p. 646, the fall of a
sugar bag on a custom house officer visiting the premises, was, unexplained, evidence of negligence. Different applications of the principle that the condition of
the property causing the injury, is ipso
facto evidence of negligence, unless explained consistently with care, may be
found in Mullen v. St. John, 57 N_ Y. 507,
Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass. 232; Smith v.
Boston Gas Light Co., 129 Mass. 318; Finnigan v. Fall River Gas Works Co., 159
Mass. 311. Though in a case similiar to
this the court thought the evidence of defendant's negligence but slight, Butcher
v. Hide, 152 N. Y., 142; that opinion was
based on the uncertainty in which the
evidence left the alleged condition of the
stair, and not on the insufficiency of this
condition, if established, to justify the inference of negligence. The Opera House
Co. should have shown when it last
inspected the stairs and what precautions
against the stairs getting into the condition here proven, it had adopted.
2. But did the negligence conduce to the
accident? A negligent man is not answerable for his negligence, but for a damage
which it has caused. Negligence without
consequent damage,damage without causal
negligence, is not actionable.
Hall v.
Allen, 2 W. 114; Pa. Co. v. James, 81 Pa.

194; Butcher v. Hyde 152 N. Y. 142. The
described step was the sixth. The plaintiff tripped on the fourth or fifth step. If
he had planted one foot on the fifth step,
and in attempting to move the other foot
from the sixth step, was impeded by the
wrinkled rubber, and caused to trip, it
would be accurate enough to say that the
tripping occurred on the fifth step. But,
the plaintiff leaves it uncertain whether
the tripping occurred on the fifth or the
fourth step. It was incumbent on him to
remove this uncertanity, if its resolution is
material to his recovery. We must assume that he tripped on the fourth step.
Then, is there evidence that the tripping,
was due to the state of the sixth step?
We do not discover such evidence. Are we
to assume that the plaintiff stepped from
the sixth to the fourth step ? He has not
said that in descending these stairs, he
overstrode alternate steps.
The jury,
cannot properly guess that he did so.
It is clear then, we think, that the causal
connection between the negligent state of
the sixth step and the fall of Patrick
Quinn is not established.
3. The view we have taken of the first
point of the defendant makes it unnecessary to consider the third with any particularity. The state of the stairway makes
it incumbent upon the Opera House Company to show that it had adopted reasonable precautions against it and similar
causes of accident.
4. Was the plaintiff contributorily negligent? He had just shaken hands with a
friend when he tripped. He was talking
loud and laughingly when the accident
happened.
As the defendant's negligence unless it
conduced to the accident is not actionable,
so the plaintiff's negligence, unless it conduced to the accident, will not prevent his
recovering. There is slight evidence that
his acts were under the circumstances negligent. Merely shaking hands on the
stairs is scarcely negligent. Perhaps the
loud and hilarious talking is evidence of
too great a dispersion of attention. We
might have submitted the negligence of
the plaintiff to the jury had that of.the defendant been sufficiently shown to have
conduced to the fall of plaintiff. Gentlemen of the Jury, as we have concluded
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that you would not be justified in finding
that the negligent state of the sixth stair
caused the accident to Patrick Quinn, you
will find a verdict for the defendant.

BOROUGH OF INNorINATUM
vs. R. R. CO.
Trespass.
FRANK H.

SHALTERS

STROUSS and

CHARLES

E.

for plaintiff.

Railroad corporations subject to ordinances as Natural Persons.-Frankford &
Phila. Passenger R. Co. v. City of Phila.,
8 P. F. Smith 119; Johnson et al. v. Phila.
el al., 10 P. F. Smith 442.
The ordinance is reasonable.-Barbier v.
Connefly, 113 U. S. 27; Penna. Co. v. James
and Wife, 81. Pa. 194; Trickett on Borough
Laws, p. 169.
Burgess has jurisdiction same as Justice
of the Peace.-Act of April 15, 1887.
The imposition of S2250 is just and
proper.-People v. McFadden, 13 Wend.
396; State v. Kansas City, etc. R. Co., 32
Fed. Rep. 722.
The ordinance has the force and effect
of a legislative act within the limits prescribed for it.-Hillard v. Lowel, 3 Allen
407.
ROBERT B. STUCKER and THOM-AS B.
PEPPER for defendant.
There can be but one violation by the
same person on the same day.-Freedborn
v. Commonwealth, 113 Pa. 242.
The proceedings before the burgess were
Several offenses
irregular an(d illegal.
were charged in a single complaint.Burnham v. Webster, 5 Mass. 266.
The burgess exceeded his authority.Act of May 19, 1887, P. L. Digest 133; Act
of April 5, 1849, P. L. Digest t09; Agnew
v. Washington Borough, 7 P. C. C. 180.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The borough of Innominatum in Pennsylvania passed an ordinance prohibiting
the running of railroad trains through it
at a greater speed than four miles per hour,
and for infractions, imposing a fine of $50
for each offence. The defendant's tracks
ran, for three blocks, through a street of
the borough. On January 17th, the defendant ran three trains over this street,
through the borough, at intervals of four
hours, at a rate not less than 10 miles per
hour. On each of the next 14 days, it did
the same. Sued before the burgess, its
Presideht appearing, he convicted the defendant of violating the ordinance 45 times,
and imposed the fine of $22.30. The burgess' record is now before the court on a
certiorari.

Had the burgess jurisdiction? The act
of May 19, 1887, 1 P. & L. 429, confers on
him the "criminal powers, jurisdiction and
authority of a justice of the peace in the
enforcement of all ordinances of the borough, and the collection of fines and penalties imposed under the same." The act
of Ap. 5, 1849, 1 P. & L. 2:550 conferred this
jurisdiction on justices of the peace. Borough Law 143. This is a proceeding for
the collection of a penalty imposed under
the borough ordinance.
The jurisdiction, however, of both justices and burgesses is limited to proceedings
to recover sums under $300. It has been
the policy of the state to so restrict the justice's power that he could entertain only
such demands as did not exceed a certain
sum of money. When the act of 1849 authorized him to impose penalties, as he
could already entertain suits for debtsI 'under $100," we do not doubt that the new
power was subjected to the same restriction.
Milliken v. Mitchell, 28 Pittsb. Leg. J. 302.
Each violation of the ordinance is alleged
to entitle the borough to the sum of $50.
There were 45 of theseviolations. Cantwo
or more penalties be combined into one action before the justice? Two or more contractual claims can be so combined, either
by the plaintiff, or, as a set-off, by the defendant.-Van Why v. Fillmore, 3 Luz.
Leg. Reg. 71; Holden v. Wiggins, 3 P. &
W. 469. In the same way two or more
penalties may be demanded in the same
suit. In Bartolett v. Achey, 38 Pa. 273, a
justice demanded illegal fees on two judgnents entered by him on the same day,
against the same defendant. Two penalties, one for each of these extortions, were
recovered in one action before ajustice. In
Gibson v. Gault, 33 Pa. 44, several penalties for illegal fees were recoverable from a
prothonotary, in one action.
The plaintiff's power of combining in
one action before a justice demands similar
in characteris, we think, incontestable. But
can he combine so many and so large claims
as that their aggregate exceeds $300?
A plaintiff may begin two actions at the
same time before ajustice for claims which,
combined, are greater than $300. In Boyle
v. Grant, 18 Pa. 162, A lending B over $100
had taken three notes each for a part of the
sum loaned. Apparently one ofhis objects
was to be able to sue his claim in case there
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was default in payment, before a justice.
His right to sue separately on the three
notes at the same time beforethesamejustice was vindicated. In 2 McKinney's
Justice, 345, a case from the Common Pleas
of Dauphin is cited, in which a laborer
having a claim for $90 for labor ascertained
by a statement furnished him by his employer, and another claim for $80 for labor
in the same employment, but subsequent
to that for which the credit of $90 was allowed by the employer, separately sued at
the same time for each of these claims.
If the same justice may be intrusted
with two claims which together exceed
$300, against the same person at the same
time, provided that these suits are distinct
for each of the individual claims, it may
be difficult to see why he is not to have
this power, if he is asked to combine them
in one action, issue one summons, enter
one judgment, and issue one execution.
Such a combination would show a meritorious readiness of the justice and plaintiff to restrict the costs that would be imposable on the defendant. Towanda Bank v.
Ballard 7 W. & S. 434. In Boyle v. Grant
supra, six separate suits on notes were
conducted before the justice at the same
time by the same laintiff against the samp
defendant.
The appeals were by the
Common Pleas consolidated, with the approbation of the Supreme Court. "It hurt
nobody," says Coulter, J., "and saved the
defendant costs."
We think, however,
that the language "justice of the peace
shall have concurrent jurisdiction with
the courts of common pleas in all actions
* * wherein the sum demanded does
not exceed $300," Act July 7, 1879, 1 P.
& L, 2553; Act March 20, 1810, 1 P. &. L.
2543, forbids the entertainment in any
one action of a demand for more than $300.
If the combination of two claims for penalties, each of which is less than $100, but
not less than $50 in one action, will confer
jurisdiction on a court (the District Court
of Philadelphia) which has no jurisdiction
of demands less than $100, Gibson v.
Gault, 33 Pa. 44, we think that such a
combination will withdraw them from the

jurisdiction of a court that cannot entertain demands for more than $100. Holden
v. Wiggins, 3 P. & W. 469, recognizes the
right to combine, for set-off, to an extent
not exceeding $100. The burgess can not
entertain demands for more than $300.
The demand in this case was therefore beyond his jurisdiction.
Is the defendant liable for 45 penalties
of $50 each ?
The power of the borough to enact an
ordinance regulating the speed of railroad
trains, cannot be disputed. Buffalo v.
New York etc. R. R. Co., 152 N. Y., 276.
Pa. R. R. Co. v. Lewis, 79 Pa. 33; Pa.
Co. v. James, 81 Pa., 194. Though such
ordinances must be reasonable, the courts
denounce them as unreasonable only in a
clear case; Fisher v. Harrisburg 2:Gr. 291;
Agnew v. Washington Borough, 7 Pa. C.
C., 180; O'Maley v. Borough of Freeport,
96 Pa., 24. Forbidding a speed in excess
of 7 miles, in Harrisburg, 79 Pa. 33, or in
excess of 5 miles in Allegheny, 81 Pa. 194,
escaped censure. We are not able to say
that a prohibition of a speed exceeding 4
miles, when running along a street in a
borough for three blocks, is unreasonable.
The ordinance penalizes each act of
running on the street at a greater speed
than 4 miles an hour. When a train first
ran, on Jan. 17th, at a greater rate, the
penalty of $50 was incurred-when, four
hours later, another train ran at the rate
of 10 miles, another violation occurred, and
its corresponding penalty was earned. It
is in the power of the borough to forbid
and punish each act, as well as a group
of acts happening on the same day. The
only question open is, as to the proper interpretation of the ordinance. In Bartolett
v. Achey, 38 Pa. 273, two penalties were
imposed for two charges of excessive fees
by the justice, on the same day, on judgments entered against the same defendant.
Friedeborn v. Commonwealth, 113 Pa.
242, turns on the meaning of the statute
concerning the Lord's Day. Noinference,
pertinent to the case before us, can be
drawn from it.
Judgment reversed.

